Introduction
In the summer of 2006, Italy took an active role in launching and sustaining UNIFIL II, the UN operation in Lebanon. Italy's decision to embark on the demanding task of participating in the mission defies mono-causal theoretical explanations. In fact, a number of drivers, which link in turn to different theories, may be used to account for this behaviour. Yet, none of these rules out the others. As we will see in the next few pages, one likely candidate as a driver is prestige (i.e. Italy sought to increase its status within the international system). Alternatively, the decision to intervene could have been taken because of a particular interest of the government in power at that given moment in time.
Furthermore, a third driver could be found in humanitarian concern. At first sight, the drivers, which we have identified, would provide competing theoretical explanations of Italy's decision to contribute to UNIFIL II. However, they are not mutually exclusive. In this article, we argue that an analytical eclectic approach, i.e. one that integrates the above-mentioned drivers and that specifies how they interact, holds more explanatory power than mono-causal explanations.
In doing so, we aim for a twofold contribution to the literature. Firstly, we are interested in contributing to the debate on International Relations (IR) theoretically based explanations of Italian foreign policy. This literature has considerably expanded in recent eclectic approach (Sil and Katzenstein 2010) , the model proposes that these factors play their own role in the causal process but also that each factor affects other causal factors.
Causal factors
The first factor, prestige, has been discussed at greater length within the classical realist paradigm (see, among others, Morgenthau 1985; Gilpin 1981) . However, this concept (or its close relative status) has recently attracted a good deal of interest in the field, so departing from its realist ancestry (Larson and Shevchenko 2010; Volgy et al. 2011; Wood 2013; Renshon 2017) . In particular, the issue has found fertile ground within the constructivist approach.
For instance, authors like Larson and Shevchenko (2010) have analysed status seeking as a strategy of social mobility: in a nutshell, states willing to increase their own status -if they share common values and do not perceive high barriers to the higher ranks of prestige -would likely avoid competition with great powers, opting instead for a strategy of imitation. On a similar vein, Volgy et al. (2010) have discussed different types of foreign policy behaviour depending on the relationship between rank and role (for an early treatment see Santoro 1991). In particular, Italy would fit the category of statusinconsistent overachiever -i.e. a country whose international standing exceeds its capabilities. Therefore, following this growing body of literature, we can assume that the decision to intervene in Lebanon was driven by considerations of status or prestige.
Beyond theoretical considerations, resorting to prestige as an explanatory factor is also consistent with the literature on Italian foreign policy. In fact, after the end of the Cold War, a broad consensus emerged on the belief that military engagement would contribute to an increase in the country's prestige in international relations (Davidson 2009; Carati and Locatelli 2015; Romero 2016: 8) . On the other hand, as noted by James Walston In light of these considerations, it is possible to argue that Italy sought to pursue prestige to obtain recognition of its status in the international stage. Two reasons support this argument's claim: firstly, given its weakness in military capabilities, Italy's commitment to multilateral peace operations is a rational strategy to demonstrate reliability as a member of the international community (Carati and Locatelli 2015) . On the other hand, as impediments to multilateral action are many -the collective action problem being the most notable -the active role played by Italy in the context of the crisis can also be understood as an attempt to make multilateralism work -i.e. costly signalling to prove the Italian commitment to multilateral institutions.
Yet, focusing solely on prestige would be a limit to our model's explanatory power. A middle power such as Italy would not be able to intervene solely because of prestige. This leads us to the second causal factor: governmental interest. To address this, we turn to the liberal school. The liberal intergovernmental approach asserts that governmental interest drives a state's intervention. Assuming that states use international institutions as a vehicle to assert their interests, where those interests come from requires investigation.
For liberalism, interests are formulated by the governments in power and should be representative of the societies they represent. The logic of liberalism is therefore consequential rather than appropriate; governments are 'motivated by the consequences that their actions are expected to bring about' (Pohl, van Willigen, and Van Vonno 2016, 67) . International institutions are the vehicles through which states pursue their interests.
However, as institutions also exert influence upon states' behaviour, states struggle to utilise international institutions for their own benefit (Vanhoonacker, Dijkstra, and Maurer 2010) . In this scenario, domestic politics is not an independent variable determining how the interest is framed before it is pursued at an institutional level.
Governments may pursue a foreign policy course not in order to maximise the country's power, but to stay in power.
In this context, Italy's decision to contribute to UNIFIL II is dependent on the governmental interest of Romano Prodi's government. When the conflict between Israel and Hezbollah started, the centre-left government had been in power for two months. The contribution to UNIFIL II represented a timely opportunity for the government to live up to the expectations, which were raised during the electoral campaign. In fact, one of Prodi's main themes during the campaign was to revamp the European Union's international role and multilateral institutions (UN in particular). In this regard, the war in Lebanon provided a double opportunity: on one hand to intervene through the United Nations; on the other, to mark a difference with the previous (purportedly calamitous) experience in Iraq led by the Berlusconi government. Our model's explanatory power relies on a third causal factor, which refers to the way in which Italy justified its choice of intervening in Lebanon: humanitarian concern. In line with our analytical eclectic approach, we argue that an ideational factor such as humanitarian concern is not enough to influence a country's decision to get involved in a conflict. Jeffrey Legro's remark that 'something more than ideas has to be involved in major foreign policy transformations ' (2005, p. 13 ) is helpful in this regard. Still, the justification for intervention (Sørensen 2008 ' (1996, 154) . Governments are driven by the logic of appropriateness in responding to societal pressures for action (Robinson 2001) .
In the case of the 2006 conflict between Israel and Hezbollah, the EU roundly condemned Israel's disproportionate use of force and thus created the normative context for the deployment of a peacekeeping force in Southern Lebanon (Smith 2006) . The UN legitimised Israel's war with Hezbollah but condemned, along with European and Arab states, Israel's 'unnecessarily disproportionate violence that had caused a human disaster' (Makdisi 2011, 13) . Following this logic, the greater the humanitarian concern, the greater the chance of success in assembling the multilateral coalition for the intervention. In the same vein, the constructivist perspective can also shed light on the way Italy decided to intervene -in other words, the humanitarian framing of the mission. Indeed, when UN resolution 1701 called for a strengthened UNIFIL force, the nature of the mission was far from clear: whether Hezbollah would surrender without resistance, and Israel forces would withdraw or not, was just a matter of speculation. In other words, when the decision to intervene was taken, the operational goals, rules of engagement and eventually the very same level of violence that Italian soldiers were about to experience remained uncertain. This is where strategic culture kicks in: borrowing (among many) from Johnston's seminal contribution, we can define the concept as 'an integrated set of symbols 
The eclectic model applied to Italy's involvement in Lebanon
We contend that in the case under scrutiny, all the causal factors played a role and an eclectic model is necessary to observe the mechanisms at play (see figure 1) . The conflict between Israel and Hezbollah posed a problem (or an opportunity) for the newly appointed Prodi government. For several reasons -the ongoing presence of Italian soldiers in the UNIFIL I mission, the enduring engagement with Lebanon through aid and development programs, and the likely implications of the war in the MENA region -the government concluded that an immediate reaction was needed in order to prevent the crisis from escalating and spreading to neighbouring countries.
2 The regional effects of the crisis, the delicate balance of the Middle East, and Italy's mere lack of capabilities, however, called for a multilateral solution. This in turn raised a collective action problem:
the international community was strongly interested in a quick solution to the conflict, but all members had an incentive to free ride. 3 Conscious of this problem (the transatlantic crisis over Iraq being a lively reminder of the limits of multilateralism), the government faced a dilemma: either buckpassing or taking the lead. This behaviour is also in line with the liberal view, especially the neoliberal institutionalist view, according to which international organisations are tools that states use to reach their goals (Keohane 1984) . However, one may argue, this is also consistent with the classical realist-inspired take on prestige: through its diplomatic and subsequently military commitment to ending the war, Italy was increasing its prestige in three critical areas. Firstly, it proved to be a worthy ally of the US. Secondly, it showed leadership as a member of the EU to revitalise the integration process. Thirdly, it proved to be an honest broker between the warring parties in the Middle East (Senato della
Repubblica 2006).
Diplomatic activism ultimately led to military intervention. The idea of strengthening the ongoing peacekeeping mission appeared from the very beginning as the most viable (although not necessarily successful) solution. As a result, the main diplomatic concern for Italy was not just to forge consensus for a UN resolution, but also to assemble a strong enough military force to fulfil the demanding tasks laid out in the mandate of the resolution. Signalling Rome's commitment to deploy a significant amount of troops proved critical to overcome the collective action problem, but forced Italy to follow through on her promises. The decision to deploy troops in Lebanon had to be justified according to rationales that could be accepted across the political spectrum. Coherently with our model, the moral concern for the affected Lebanese population led to the humanitarian framing of the intervention.
The remainder of this article will assess the fit between the model and the case study based on a qualitative account of the Italian reaction to the war. Admittedly, being impossible to access classified documents and resort to in-depth interviews, we aim to provide a plausibility test of our model focused on publicly accessible data, namely the government's public declarations and the resulting parliamentary debate.
Italy's choice to intervene in Lebanon
How did Italy react to the 2006 conflict in Lebanon? Which foreign policy choices eventually led to the deployment of a 2500-strong contingent in the region? What rationale drove such behaviour? Did the drivers discussed above play any role in this calculation? To answer these questions, and to fully appreciate the complex decisions the Italian government took at the time, let us start by recalling Italy's political scenario. From a diplomatic perspective, the problem was then two-fold: to gather consensus on the form the UN intervention should take (i.e. how to frame a new resolution), and to make sure that an eventual blue-helmets mission was operationally capable. as she claimed, the high stakes of the war in terms of human security made it a moral obligation for Italy to do whatever possible to prevent the conflict from further escalation or spill over. In her intervention, she underscored how the war could trigger a regional crisis whose effects could endanger peace on a global scale. In her own words, 'The mission […] will be long, demanding, costly and risky. But it is just and necessary and for this reason it must be supported' (Camera dei Deputati 2006a). Therefore, as the constructivist view would hold, it is safe to say that the political discourse was influenced by a humanitarian framing of the mission.
However, the humanitarian concern is hardly enough on its own to explain the Italian involvement in the mission. Coherently with our model, in his analysis Coticchia finds that the parliamentary debate most frequently referred to multilateralism as a main driver of action. This is due to the continuous references to the UN resolution 1701, but also to the self-professed role that Rome was playing in gathering a coalition of allies (Ignazi, Giacomello, and Coticchia 2011, 78) . Eventually, the most explicit supporter of prestige as a key interest of the country was Senator Polito, who openly stated that 'increasing Italy's prestige (autorevolezza) and weight in the future decisions of the international community [is] highly valuable for the national interest' (Senato della Repubblica 2006b, 27). Therefore, it seems safe to conclude that the issue of prestige entered the parliamentary debate, but it did not enjoy a widely shared recognition as a rationale for the intervention.
Conclusion
For Italy, participating in the UNIFIL II mission was a demanding and risky task. In the absence of a direct threat and a clear strategic interest, we were interested in investigating how single, competing drivers could interact and contribute to an analytical eclectic explanation. In comparison to previous theoretically informed contributions on Italian foreign policy, we presented an analytical eclectic model of military intervention in multilateral operations which blends prestige, governmental interest and humanitarian concern coherently and which, in our view, holds more explanatory power.
Governmental interest, prestige and humanitarian concern all conflated into the Italian government's decision to get involved in the crisis. In particular, we have argued that the Prodi government's interest in multilateralism made Italy's peculiar reaction to the war in Lebanon possible. A governmental goal maximized the unity of the coalition. It also provided a point of departure from the previous Berlusconi administration and allowed
Italy to obtain international legitimacy. At the same time, the government sought to increase its international prestige in at least two ways. Firstly, by leading diplomatic negotiations and carrying a significant share of the burden, it proved aware of the limits of multilateralism. Secondly, despite the fact that the Prodi government denied any deliberate attempt to pursue anything of the sort of a national interest, it also tried to increase the Italian standing and influence in international institutions. Finally, the constructivist focus on culture and norms allows us to make sense of the narrative that informed the parliamentary debate and the overall conception of Italy's role in Lebanon.
To conclude, this work presented a single case study for the purpose of a plausibility test of the model that we introduced. We are aware of the limits of the eclectic approach we have used here -most significantly, the narrow focus on just three causal factors.
However, we believe that the model sheds light on the foreign policy drivers of middle powers. As such, it could be applied to other middle powers to make sense of their contribution to military missions absent clear interests in doing so. Furthermore, as concerns the Italian case, a more detailed account of the decision making that led to the intervention could be made through process tracing: a detailed account of the key governmental players and their role in the lead-up to the deployment of UNIFIL II will probably shed light on the motives and intentions underlying this choice. Moving beyond Italy, the broader question concerns whether the mechanism displayed in the previous paragraph is also at play in other countries; and, if not, what are the conditions that must be met to make it work elsewhere? As a result, in the future our findings could be tested by using different case studies or by carrying out comparative analyses.
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